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THE NEW MEXICO CHILDREN'S CODE:
SOME REMAINING PROBLEMS
THEODORE E. LAUER*

The New Mexico Children's Code was enacted by the legislature in
1972 and became effective July 1 of that year.' The ensuing years
have seen the growth of experience with the Code by judges, lawyers,
probation staffs and law enforcement officers, the beginning of an
encrustation of appellate judicial interpretive gloss, numerous
legislative amendments to the Code, the promulgation by the
Supreme Court of Children's Court Rules which generally clarify the
Code but in some measure supersede or contradict it, a determined
legislative effort in 1979 to repeal the Children's Code and replace it
with a so-called Juvenile Code, 2 and the appointment of a task force
by the Governor to study the Children's Code and make recommendations for change. 3 All this has occurred in less than a decade, and
there is the promise of much more to come in the years immediately
ahead.
The whole spectacle might be viewed as a vast public entertainment were it not for the sobering fact that the Children's Code represents New Mexico's attempt to deal with a matter universally regarded with deadly seriousness: our children. When we consider the
many children who commit crimes, or who are stubborn and rebellious, or who are neglected or abused by their parents, we become
very serious indeed; because to acknowledge that children are in
these difficulties demonstrates forcefully that important aspects of
our society are somehow tragically out of control. Children should
respect society's laws and should be contrite and obedient to their
*Attorney at law, Lauer & Mandel, Santa Fe, New Mexico; former Director of the National
Juvenile Law Center, St. Louis, Missouri; State Chairman of the New Mexico Council on
Crime and Delinquency, 1978-present; B.A., Millikin University, Decatur, Illinois, 1953;
LL.B., Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, 1956; S.J.D., University of Michigan,
1958.
1. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 97. The Children's Code was codified in the 1953 New Mexico
Statutes Annotated as §§ 13-14-1 to 13-14-45, and has been codified in the 1978 New Mexico
Statutes Annotated as §§ 32-1-1 to 32-1-48.
2. S.B. 231, N.M. 34th Leg., 1st Sess. (1979). The bill was passed by the Senate but failed to
pass in the House.
3. The task force was appointed pursuant to H.M. 58, N.M. 34th Leg., Ist Sess. (1979).
Curiously, while the House Memorial requested Governor Bruce King "to appoint a task force
on the Children's Code," the Governor denominated the group as the "Juvenile Code Task
Force."
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parents; parents in turn should cherish their children and ensure that
they are properly supervised and cared for. That children and
parents fail to meet our expectations is cause for great concern,
which is rendered all the more intense because, in spite of our professed good intentions, we seem unable to stem the tide of this social
malaise, much less find a cure for it.
The history of society's attempts to deal with the problem is well
documented.' In New Mexico, 1917 marked the beginning of legislative recognition that the problems of delinquent and neglected
children require special treatment.' Two acts, which together constitute the antecedents of the Children's Code, were passed in that
year. The first was entitled "An Act Defining Juvenile Delinquents,
Providing for Their Reformation or Punishment and Providing for
the Punishment of Those Who Contribute to Such Delinquency.' '6
Under this Act, a juvenile delinquent was anyone under sixteen years
of age7 who violated any state or municipal law, or who partook of a
list of other activities ranging from knowingly associating with
"thieves, vicious or immoral persons," to patronizing or visiting a
public pool hall, to habitually wandering "in the railroad yards or
tracks . ...
I The Act created a juvenile court, 9 with power to adjudge juvenile delinquents wards of the court'" and to commit them
to the New Mexico Reform School or the Girls Welfare Board."
The second 1917 Act was entitled "An Act to Provide for the
Care, Treatment, Control and Disposition of Dependent and
Neglected Children and Providing for the Punishment of Persons
Contributing to Such Dependency and Neglect."' 2 This Act empowered the district courts to adjudge as wards of the court and to
place under the guardianship of individuals or associations any child
4. The early history may be found in such works as H. Finestone, Victims of Change (1976),
and A. Platt, The Child Savers (2d ed. 1977). See also President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 55-89
(1967).
5. Pre-1917 recognition was largely confined to such enactments as 1893 N.M. Laws ch. 32,
§ 8, providing that the probate court might deprive "common prostitutes or inhabitants or inmates of a house of ill-fame" of the custody of their children, and 1903 N.M. Laws ch. 2, § 2,
which established the New Mexico Reform School "somewhere within the counties of Taos,
The School was originally located at El Rito in Rio Arriba
Rio Arriba or San Juan ......
County, but was removed to Springer in 1909. 1909 N.M. Laws ch. 126, § 1.
6. 1917 N.M. Laws ch. 4.
7. Jurisdictional age was raised to "under the age of eighteen years" by 1929 N.M. Laws ch.
74,§ 1.
8. 1917 N.M. Laws ch. 4, § 1.
9. Id. § 2.
10. Id. § 5.
!1. See 1903 N.M. Laws ch. 2, § 10; 1919 N.M. Laws ch. 86, § 3.
12. 1917 N.M. Laws ch. 85.
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under the age of sixteen without parental care, "found begging or
soliciting or receiving alms;" found in a house of prostitution or
"living with any vicious or disreputable person;" or living in a home
unfit by reason of "neglect, abuse, mistreatment, cruelty or depravity" by parents, guardians or custodians.' 3
The statutes relating to juvenile delinquents were amended significantly in 1943,'4 and were overhauled completely in 1955 by the
adoption of a Juvenile Code. 5 The original statutes relating to
dependent and neglected children remained intact without significant amendment.' 6 Thus until 1972, New Mexico had separate
courts and separate procedures dealing with these two classes of
children.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, increasing public and judicial attention was focused upon the operation of the courts that dealt with
delinquent and neglected children. In the midst of what has been
characterized as the "due process revolution," questions were raised
about the fundamental fairness of juvenile court procedures which
often failed to provide basic safeguards for the rights of children.
Juvenile court procedures were challenged for failure to provide adequate notice of proceedings, protection against ex parte determination of rights, counsel for indigent persons, and rights to crossexamine witnesses or not to incriminate oneself. The greatest single
change was brought about by a 1967 decision of the United States
Supreme Court, In re Gault. ' Immediately following the Gault decision, many states took steps to reform their juvenile law system;
New Mexico was among them.
The adoption of the Children's Code in 1972 brought about a
great change in the substantive law and procedure relating to delinquent children, neglected children, and "children in need of supervision." Children in need of supervision are those who have violated
no criminal laws applicable to adults, but who are in need of care or
supervision because of habitual truancy, ungovernability, or commission of an offense not criminal or an offense applicable only to
children. 8 A children's court division of the district court was created
to deal with children who were alleged to be delinquent, neglected,
or in need of supervision. The children's court was also to handle
13. Id. §§ 2,6.
14. 1943 N.M. Laws ch. 40.
15. 1955 N.M. Laws ch. 205.
16. Principal changes were a provision that children who had been wards of the court for six
months or more might be "legally freed for adoption," 1961 N.M. Laws ch. 177, § 1,and the
child abuse reporting law, 1965 N.M. Laws ch. 157, §§ 1-5.
17. 387 U.S. I(1967).
18. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 97, § 3(M) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-3(M) (1978)).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

other legal problems of children, including termination of parental
rights, adoption, marriage, and commitment of mentally retarded or
mentally ill minors. I9
The New Mexico Children's Code was largely drawn from model
legislation published in 1969 by the Children's Bureau of the Social
and Rehabilitation Service of the United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare. Entitled "Legislative Guide for
Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts," 2 the model statute provided both the framework for the Children's Code and the specific
language for many, if not most, of the Code sections. The model
statute was written to strengthen the rights of children in the juvenile
court; it retained the traditional juvenile court framework in large
part, but embodied what was then the most advanced thinking in
terms of children's rights and procedural safeguards.
The Children's Code met with strong opposition from the beginning. 2 ' To some who opposed the formalization of procedures and
the "legalization" of the court, the Children's Code was seen as unduly limiting the freedom previously enjoyed by the courts in shaping procedures. They argued that the Code was cumbersome, unintelligible, and needlessly restrictive. To others, the Code accorded
too many rights to children and parents. They argued that the Code
was too liberal, too soft on kids. Some opponents wanted to repeal
the Code altogether, while others apparently would be content with
19. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 97, §§ 4, 9 (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32-1-4, 32-1-9
(1978)).
20. U.S. Dep't. of Health, Education, & Welfare, Family and Juvenile Court Acts:
Legislative Guide for Drafting (1969). The model statute was prepared by William H.
Sheridan.
21. Examination of the Children's Code as originally enacted in 1972 reveals that there was
merit in a number of the criticisms directed to obscure or unworkable features of the Code. For
example, section 17 of the Legislative Guide attempted to remedy problems of delay in
children's proceedings by imposing strict time limits upon commencement of the adjudicatory
hearing after a petition alleging delinquency or need of supervision had been filed. The hearing
was to be commenced within ten days if the child were in detention and twenty days if the child
were not. The Children's Code adopted these time limits. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 97, § 26 (current
version as amended at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-28 (1978)). The limits proved to be too short in
practice, dictating a breakneck speed which often worked against the child's interests by giving
defense counsel inadequate time to prepare or negotiate with the children's court attorney, and
by not allowing time for matters to return to normal after the commission of a delinquent act.
Moreover, these short time limits in the Code were impractical, given the rural nature of much
of New Mexico. Rural areas were faced with problems of distance and availability of judges
and with the fact that in 1972 there were no government employed lawyers such as public
defenders or law guardians charged with representation of children in delinquency or in need
of supervision cases.
In some respects, therefore, the Legislative Guide was deceptive, because it was not the
carefully drafted, integrated, seasoned code that it purported to be. Some of its provisions
were frankly experimental, as in the case of the time limitations. The Children's Code, patterned after the Legislative Guide, thus contained some unworkable or undesirable provisions.
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substantial amendments. The opposition has brought about a series
of amendments which have removed some of the objectionable
features.
Amendments were necessary as experience uncovered the shortcomings of the Code provisions. In the years since 1972, legislative
amendments to the Code have been frequent2" although some of the
amendments caused new problems. 23 The Children's Court Rules,
adopted by the Supreme Court in 1976 and revised materially in
1978, also significantly clarified the Code.
The Children's Code will be further amended as changes occur in
society and in the constitutional and legal milieu of the Code. This
article addresses some of the problems the author perceives to exist
at this time and it must be acknowledged to reflect the author's point
of view and biases. While another observer might have a different
view, experience shows that something approaching a consensus
exists as to what the problems are; there is a lack of consensus as to
the solutions.
CHILDREN'S COURT RULES: CONFLICT WITH THE CODE
One of the principal problems of the Children's Code lies in the
conflict between the Code as enacted by the legislature and the
Children's Court Rules as promulgated by the supreme court. At the
level of practical application, the issue involves locating the dividing
line between matters of substantive law which are within the power
of the legislature to enact and matters of judicial procedure which
are within the power of the supreme court to adopt. At a more basic
level, the issue entails a struggle between legislature and court over
which shall exercise the power to create law. Substantive law and
procedure are not entirely distinct; they tend to merge into each
other so as to obscure whether the law-making power in certain areas
belongs to court or legislature. The power to resolve the conflict
seems to lie with the supreme court, inasmuch as the court interprets
both legislative acts and its own rules and therefore has the last word
as to which shall prevail when conflict arises. 2 '
The legislature sought to assert the upper hand in the Children's
Code where it directed: "The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure not in conflict with the Children's Code governing proceed22. Since 1973 there have been 43 amendments to the various sections of the Children's
Code.
23. See text at note 147 infra.
24. The legislature's only retaliation may come from its power over the purse, whereby
judicial salaries may be held down, new judgeships denied, and the courts reduced to penury in
terms of support services and staff salaries.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

ings in the children's court and family court including rules and
procedures for juries."

25

The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted Children's Court Rules
effective April 1, 1976, to "govern the procedure in the children's
courts of New Mexico in all matters involving children alleged to be
delinquent, in need of supervision or neglected, as defined in the
Children's Code." 26 Many of the Rules are in conflict with the
Children's Code.2" The Rules themselves neither acknowledge nor
disavow the legislative mandate that the Rules must be in accord
with the Code provisions; however, the Committee Commentary
makes clear that the legislative directive was considered essentially
meaningless.
Although there are various statutory provisions authorizing
the Supreme Court to adopt rules of procedure in civil and
criminal cases, including rules for the children's court, the
rulemaking power of the Supreme Court is a constitutional
power which inherently belongs to the judicial branch of government under the doctrine of separation of powers.28
A conflict therefore exists; how should it be resolved?
Rulemaking power was first explicitly recognized in New Mexico
case law in the 1936 supreme court decision State v. Roy,29 where
the court noted the existence "of an inherent power lodged in us to
prescribe such rules of practice, pleading, and procedure as will
facilitate the administration of justice." 3 Eleven years later in State
v. Arnold,3 ' the court addressed a conflict between a statute and a
court rule. The legislature had provided a six month period for taking civil appeals but the court had adopted a three month rule. The
court acknowledged that the right of appeal is substantive, but held
that the court could regulate that right through rules. "Nevertheless,
once the legislature has authorized the appeal, reasonable regulations affecting the time and manner of taking and perfecting the
25. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 97, § 4(C) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-4(C) (1978)).
26. Child. Ct. R. (a). For a detailed discussion of the content of the 1976 Rules, see Harris,
Children's Court Practice in Delinquency and Need of Supervision Cases Under the New
Rules, 6 N.M.L. Rev. 331 (1976).
27. See text accompanying notes 38-63 infra.
28. Child. Ct. R. 1-2 note. The commentary to Rules I and 2 closes with the statement that
"the procedures set forth in these rules supersede many of the procedures set forth in the
Children's Code in effect at the time of adoption of. . . [these] rules."
29. 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646(1936).
30. 40 N.M. at 420, 60 P.2d at 660.
31. 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947).
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same are procedural and within this court's rulemaking power." 2 In
1969, the supreme court, in Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya,33
held that once the court has adopted a rule of procedure, the
legislature is without power to amend the rule. This holding was
reaffirmed in 1976, in Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. "
In that case a statute creating a newsman's privilege of nondisclosure
was held to conflict with Rule of Evidence 501, which recognized
only constitutional evidentiary prvileges and those set forth in the
Rules of Evidence. Therefore the rule prevailed. On the other hand,
Alexander v. Delgado,3" decided in 1973, and State v. Herrera,3 6
decided in 1978, stated that a statute which purported to govern procedure but did not conflict with any supreme court rule would be
followed by the court if "reasonable and workable." 7
Three kinds of conflict exist between the Children's Code and the
Children's Court Rules: innocuous conflicts which may be jurisprudentially troublesome but are without much practical effect; procedural conflicts which are clearly within the judicial prerogative;
and conflicts which may constitute judicial overreaching because
they affect substantive rights.
Some of the conflicts between the Rules and the Code are relatively innocuous. The Code provides that when a child is taken into
custody and detained, the parents shall be given written notice
"immediately, and in no case later than twenty-four hours." 3 The
Rule provides that the parents be advised (not specifying that the
advisement be in writing) "as soon as practicable but no later than
twenty-four hours." 3 9 In this instance, it is difficult to see how there
is any practical difference between the Code and the Rule. Similarly,
the Code requires that the children's court advise persons before the
court of their basic rights at each appearance before the court;"0 the
32. 51 N.M. at 314, 183 P.2d at 846-47.
33. 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176 (1969).
34. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
35. 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973).
36. 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1978).
37. The "reasonable and workable" language is set forth in Alexander, 84 N.M. at 718, 507
P.2d at 779, and appears to render overbroad Chief Judge Wood's statement in Herrerathat a
statute regulating procedure "is given effect until there is a conflict between the statute and a
rule adopted by the Supreme Court." 92 N.M. at 12, 582 P.2d at 389. Consideration should be
given to Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975), in which the supreme court
refused to follow a statutory limitation placed upon quo warranto proceedings, although there
was no specific rule in point. A final case on the rule making power is Delgado v. Stanley, 83
N.M. 626, 495 P.2d 1073 (1972).
38. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-23(C) (1978).
39. Child. Ct. R. 25(b).
40. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-27(K), -31(A) (1978).
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Rules require notification of rights only at the first appearance."'
Again, it is not likely that the difference is significant.
A procedural conflict relates to the time limits for commencing
hearings on the allegations of the petition after it has been filed. The
Children's Code presently provides that a delinquency or need of
supervision petition must be dismissed with prejudice unless the
hearing on the petition is begun within fifteen days from its filing if
the child is denied release at the detention hearing, or within fortyfive days if the child never was in custody, or, having been in
custody, was released before or at the detention hearing. 2
Children's Court Rule 46, on the other hand, places a limit of thirty
days from service of the petition upon the respondent "if the respondent is in detention" and a ninety-day limit "if the respondent is not
in detention." Thus the Rule differs from the Code in two respects:
the time periods under the Rule are twice as long as those under the
Code, and the time period under the Rule begins to run only when
the petition is served upon the child, rather than when the petition is
filed. 3 The conflict between Code and Rule was considered by the
Court of Appeals in State v. Doe"' in 1977. The hearing in that case
had been commenced within the time permitted by the Rule, but
beyond the period allowed by the Children's Code. The court of
appeals declared that the Rules are controlling: "Time limits are
procedural.""
The Doe decision is fully consistent with prior supreme court
holdings that, once a judicial proceeding has been initiated, time
41. Child. Ct. R. 27, 55. The Rules require advisement to a limited class, namely
"respondents'"-the child in a delinquency or need or supervision proceeding, and the neglecting parent in a neglect case; the Code requires advisement of basic rights to "persons before the
court" which includes persons other than "respondents." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31(A)
(1978).
42. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-28(A) (1978).
43. Another potential conflict exists in how a child is to be treated who has been released at
some time following the detention hearing, but prior to the beginning of the hearing or the petition. Is such a child "in detention" within the meaning of Rule 46(a)? The Committee Commentary to Rule 46, however, seems to indicate that the issue is whether the child is in detention
at the time of the adjudicatory hearing: "In terms of the time limit, the rule makes no distinction between a respondent who has been in detention and was released and one who had never
been in detention." If this is true, a child can be released from detention on the 29th day, in
which case the time period becomes 90 days and not 30. It seems that a child can be released on
the 29th day but placed back in detention on the 31st day and then held in detention until the
hearing, which need not be until the 90th day. See State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 568, 566 P.2d 117 (Ct.
App. 1977) and text accompanying notes 48-49 infra.
44. 90 N.M. 568, 566 P.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1977). As an interesting aside, although it is clearly
a procedural matter, most appeals from children's court judgments in delinquency or need of
supervision cases have been docketed as State v. Doe even though the approved form of
, a
children's court pleadings and orders uses the caption In the Matter of
Child.
45. 90 N.M. at 572, 566 P.2d at 121.
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limits for hearings on appeals are a matter of judicial procedure over
which the court exercises exclusive power."' However, when the
scope of inquiry is shifted to time limits outside of judicial proceedings-such as those which govern when a proceeding must be initiated-different considerations apply, inasmuch as these time limits
may involve matters of substantive right and not judicial procedure.
The period of a statute of limitations is a case in point. Section 32-1-

14(D) of the Code provides that the preliminary inquiry by probation services must be completed within thirty days from the date the
complaint is made,' 7 and that unless a petition alleging delinquency
or need of supervision is filed within forty-five days from the date
the complaint was referred to probation services, the petition will be
dismissed with prejudice.4" Rule 19(a)(l), on the other hand, requires
that the preliminary inquiry in delinquency and need of supervision
cases be completed within thirty days from the date of the first notice
to the child and parents of the initial conference. The Rule does not
state what length of time may elapse between receipt of the complaint by probation services and the notice to the child and parents.
Rule 22(a)(1) provides that the petition shall be filed "within thirty
days from the date the preliminary inquiry was concluded."
The conflict is clear: the Code allows a maximum of forty-five
days from the referral of the complaint to probation services until
the filing of a petition alleging delinquency or need of supervision.
The Rules allow a maximum of sixty days from the first notice to the
child and parent until the filing of the petition"9 and require that the
petition be filed within thirty days from the completion of the
preliminary inquiry. Are these time limits substantive or procedural?
Note that the time limits do not arise within the context of a judicial
proceeding, but instead dictate when the proceeding must begin.
The conflict came to judicial attention in the 1978 case of State v.
Doe,'0 in which Judge Sutin of the New Mexico Court of Appeals
46. Delgado v. Stanley, 83 N.M. 626, 495 P.2d 1073 (1972); Southwest Underwriters v.
Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176 (1969); State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845
(1947).
47. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-14(B) (1978).
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-14(D) (1978). The discussion in the text assumes that the child is
not in detention while the preliminary inquiry is being conducted.
49. It should be noted that the court of appeals has held (1) that a failure to give notice of
the preliminary inquiry is not objectionable unless prejudice is shown, State v. Doe, 92 N.M.
198, 585 P.2d 342 (Ct. App. 1978); and (2) that a valid preliminary inquiry may be held without
any initial conference. State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 232, 572 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1977). What effect
do these rulings have upon the running of the time period within which a petition must be
filed?
50. 91 N.M. 393, 574 P.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1978). There appears to be no conflict as to the
effect of failing to file the petition within the time required, whether the Code or the Rule is to
be applied. The remedy under either is dismissal of the petition with prejudice, as this case
held.
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stated: "There is a conflict between Rule 23(c)(1) [now Rule 22(c)(1)]
and § 13-14-14(D) [now § 32-1-14(D)] as to the time period the petition must be filed. As to this time period, the Supreme Court Rule is
controlling, State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 568, 566 P.2d 117 (Ct. App.
1977). '" I
The case cited as authority for this conclusion, however, dealt
with internal time limits to be applied once a judicial proceeding had
started, not with the time within which a proceeding must be initiated. 52 A very real distinction, which Judge Sutin apparently failed
to perceive, exists between the two. Judge Hernandez, who concurred in the result that the petition be dismissed, rejected the
reasoning of the majority and wrestled with the problem of reconciling both Code and Rule, so that the maximum forty-five day period
of the Code might be applied.5 3
Several conflicts exist which may constitute judicial infringement
of substantive rights. One potentially troublesome conflict arises
between Code and Rules as to who may sign a children's court petition. The Code provides that a delinquency petition may be signed
by "any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed of them and believes that they are true," and a neglect or
need of supervision petition may be signed by "only the children's
court attorney, a parent, a guardian," representatives of certain
social agencies, or specified school officials. 5" The Rules, on the
other hand, require that all petitions be signed by the children's
court attorney. I"The issue here is not the mere formality as to whose
hand should sign the petition; instead it relates to the question of
who should be empowered to initiate a children's court proceeding.
The Rules give exclusive power to the children's court attorney; if
that official declines to sign a petition, no children's court action can
be initiated. The Children's Code, on the other hand, places the
power in a broader group of persons so that no one person can prevent a matter from being taken before the court. This is a matter of
public policy. Should it be determined by the legislature or by the
supreme court? 6
51. Id. at 395, 574 P.2d at 1023 (emphasis added).
52. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
53. 91 N.M. at 396-97, 574 P.2d at 1024-25. (Hernandez, J., concurring). The author is
sympathetic to the problem which Judge Hernandez sought to confront, as it is difficult to see
how a time limitation on initiating a judicial proceeding is a matter affecting judicial procedure
rather than being a question of substantive law.
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-18(1978).
55. Child. Ct. R. 22(a), 57(a).
56. It can hardly be denied that the process of enacting legislation, in which both the
legislative and executive branches participate, is more democratic than the process of adopting
rules of court.
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Another conflict area which is not clearly within judicial procedure involves the consent decree. The Children's Code provides
that upon agreement by the child, a consent decree may be entered at
any time prior to the entry of a judgment in a delinquency or need of
of supervision case. 57 The Code section does not expressly require
that the child make any admission of guilt, but only that he consent
to being placed under supervision in his own home "under terms and
conditions negotiated with probation services and agreed to by all
the parties affected.""8
The consent decree envisioned by the Children's Code is a diversionary device, designed to permit the child to avoid admission or
adjudication by conducting himself according to his agreement for a
specified period. Under the Code, the petition must be dismissed if
the period of supervision is satisfactorily completed. Should the
child fail to comply with the agreement, the petition may be
reinstated and "the proceeding on the petition shall be continued to
conclusion as if the consent decree had never been entered." 59
The Children's Court Rules destroyed the consent decree envisioned by the Code and replaced it with a procedure which is similar
to a plea of guilty and a deferred sentence in a criminal case. The
court adopted Rules 32 and 33 in 1976. Rule 32 provided that before
a consent decree could be entered, the child was required to "admit
sufficient facts to invoke the jurisdiction of the court." The decree
under Rule 32 might place the child under supervision "in his home
or in the home of another person." Rule 33 provided that if the child
failed to fulfill the terms of the consent decree, the decree might be
revoked, whereupon the court could extend the period of the original
decree or make "any other disposition which would have been
appropriate in the original proceeding." In 1978 the Rules were
amended and renumbered. The new Rules 44 and 45 require the child
to admit "sufficient facts to permit a finding that the allegations of
the petition are true," or to enter what is fundamentally a nolo contendere plea. 60 The terms of the consent decree are no longer limited
57. N.M. Star. Ann. § 32-1-36(A) (1978).
58. Id.
59. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-36(D) (1978). The concept of the consent decree originated in
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force
Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 21-22 (1967), and was thereafter incorporated
into § 33 of the Children's Bureau Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court
Acts (1969), which provision was adopted almost verbatim by New Mexico's Children's Code.
The only significant difference between the President's Commission Report and the Children's
Code is that the former would have permitted extension of a consent decree only with the consent of the child, while the Children's Code permits extension by order of the court over the
child's objection.
60. Child. Ct. R. 44(a).
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to placement in the home of the child or another person, but now extend to any "terms and conditions negotiated and agreed to by the
respondent and the children's court attorney." ' 6' Provisions for
revocation of the consent decree remain the same, but the Committee Commentary now points out that "[i]f the consent decree is
revoked and the original petition alleged delinquency, the respondent could be committed to the Boys' School at Springer or the
Girls' Welfare Home until twenty-one years of age." '16 The permuta-

tion of the consent decree to simply another form of post-adjudication probation is complete. 3
The underlying problem again is whether the Code's consent
decree procedure conferred upon the child a substantive right to a
remedy which could dispose of a delinquency or need of supervision
charge without an admission of guilt and without a trial. Should the
power to create such a right lie in the law-making branch of government or in the judiciary? And if the legislature does create such a
right, should the supreme court abrogate it? In the final analysis,
although it may be conceded that with regard to judicial procedures
the supreme court has inherent power to make rules, the power to
make laws has generally been conferred upon the legislative branch.
The supreme court should recognize this by a policy of abstention
from rule-making in those areas in which substantive rights have
been created by the legislature.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Child'sRight to Counsel
The Children's Code provides for the right to counsel for children
in delinquency and need of supervision cases. If the child does not
have retained counsel, the court is directed to appoint counsel for the
child.6 The right to appointed counsel may, however, be waived "by
61. Id. 44(b). Conceivably, the "terms and conditions negotiated and agreed to" might include a sixty-day diagnostic commitment of the child to the diagnostic unit located at the Girls'
Welfare Home in Albuquerque.
62. Child. Ct. R. 45 note.
63. Id. The Committee Commentary to revised Rules 44 and 45 makes it clear that the drafting committee believed the Code's original consent decree provision was less than desirable,
and so the committee went to work to change it. Evidently the committee had difficulty with
the concept of placing a child under supervision while deferring entry of an order or judgment;
by analogy to criminal cases it was an exercise of judicial power without a conviction. The
committee saw no "jurisdictional basis" for the court's approval of the consent decree unless
the child admitted his guilt and the court could enter some form of judgment or order. There
does not seem to be any reason why the child's agreement to submit to a consent decree could
not have been sufficient to confer jurisdiction without an admission of guilt. There is no good
reason to tie children's justice to criminal justice conceptualism.
64. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-27(E) (1978).
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the child and the parents, guardian or custodian."" The Code provision permitting waiver represents a departure from the Legislative
Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts, which contained a non-waivable right to counsel for the child in delinquency
and need of supervision cases."
The Code provision permitting waiver may be somewhat ambiguous, in that it is not clear whether the intendment is that the
right to appointed counsel may be waived by either the child, the
parents, the guardian or the custodian acting independently, or that
waiver must be by both the child and the parents, guardian or custodian. On balance, the construction requiring concurrence of both
not only is preferable as a matter of policy, but seems also to be dictated by constitutional considerations.6 7 Waiver of counsel is permitted by the Children's Code not only in proceedings upon the petition itself but also in hearings to decide whether the child shall be
transferred to the district court for criminal prosecution."
The Children's Court Rules appear to mandate the appointment
of counsel for the child in delinquency and need of supervision cases.
Thus Rule 22(d) directs the court to appoint an attorney to represent
the child "unless counsel has entered an appearance" on the child's
behalf. Rule 43(b), governing transfer hearings, provides that
"[u]pon filing of the motion for transfer, the respondent shall be
appointed counsel if he is not represented by an attorney." Nowhere
do the Rules state that the right to counsel may be waived by the
child, and the use of the mandatory "shall" to describe the appointment of counsel indicates there is to be no waiver. The Committee
Commentaries to the Children's Court Rules, however, cloud the
picture. The Commentary to Rule 27, after noting that the child's
right to counsel cannot be waived by parent, guardian or custodian,
concludes "[flor a discussion of waiver of the right to counsel by the
child, see Bouldin v. Cox, 76 N.M. 93,412 P.2d 392 (1966)."
Bouldin v. Cox is a pre-Children's Code case, and deals with a
65. Id.
66. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, & Welfare, Family and Juvenile Court Acts:
Legislative Guide for Drafting § 25(a) (1969).
67. See also Child. Ct. R. 27 note. To allow a parent to waive the child's right to counsel
without the child's concurrence would be violative of fundamental law. Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1 (1966), held that counsel cannot waive constitutional rights of a criminal defendant
who does not wish to waive his rights. The position of a parent is no stronger than that of
counsel. See also In re Collins, 20 Ohio App. 2d 319, 322, 253 N.E.2d 824, 827 (1969): "No
case . . . has held that a parent could waive the constitutional rights of a minor in a juvenile
court or criminal case."
68. This conclusion is impelled by the fact that the waiver provision of § 32-1-27(E) is
general and there is no special provision for counsel in the transfer sections, §§ 32-1-29 and
32-1-30.
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waiver by an eighteen year old in a criminal prosecution and not with
the waiver of counsel by a child alleged to be delinquent or in need of
supervision. The decision rejected the claim that because the defendant had only a fifth grade education and no prior experience in
criminal proceedings and did not understand that he had a right to
appointed counsel, his waiver was not intelligently made. The
supreme court agreed that courts should proceed cautiously in
criminal prosecutions, but ruled "[in the instant case, there was no
allegation or proof of ignorance, illiteracy, mental incompetency,
feeblemindedness or any other abnormal traits; nor has any inducement or pressure been shown." 9
Apparently the Committee advocates that a child have the right to
waive counsel in the absence of inducement, pressure, ignorance,
illiteracy, or "other abnormal traits." This analysis of the Committee's view is further substantiated by the Commentary to Rule 43,
which cites three pre-Children's Code decisions for the proposition
that the right to counsel in a transfer hearing "may be waived if not
timely raised.""0 Although these cases appear to imply that there
may be a waiver in the children's court proceeding, they do not, in
fact, stand for that proposition. They stand for the proposition that
where a child is not represented and not offered counsel at the transfer hearing, is thereafter transferred for criminal prosecution, and
makes no objection at arraignment in the district court, he has
waived the right to challenge the defect in the transfer proceeding."'
The relevance of these decisions to procedural requirements under
the Children's Code is doubtful at best; furthermore, they were
decided prior to In re Doe 11,7 which held that an order transferring
a child for criminal prosecution is directly appealable. Therefore
under present practice a child who is denied basic rights at a transfer
hearing may raise the issue by appeal at once, and need not wait until
after he has been criminally convicted to do so.
The issue is whether the child's right to counsel should be waivable
in proceedings under the Children's Code."3 The arguments in favor
69. Bouldin v. Cox, 76 N.M. 93, 99,412 P.2d 392,396(1966).
70. The three decisions are State v. Salazar, 79 N.M. 592, 446 P.2d 644 (1968); Neller v.
State, 79 N.M. 528, 445 P.2d 949 (1968); and State v. Gallegos, 82 N.M. 618, 485 P.2d 374 (Ct.
App. 1971).
71. The dissent of Judge Wood in Neller v. State, 79 N.M. at 534, 445 P.2d at 955, would
probably prevail today.
72. 86 N.M. 37, 519 P.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1974).
refrain from appointing counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants so long as they did not
73. Note that after In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), there is no serious question remaining as
to the child's right to counsel, or the child's right to appointed counsel if he is unable to retain
counsel. See 387 U.S. at 34-42. The right to appointed counsel remains unaffected by the recent
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of allowing waiver are principally that counsel is not absolutely
necessary in every case, and that since an adult has the right to waive
counsel in criminal cases, a child should have the same right. The
arguments for mandatory representation by counsel are based upon
the belief that the child cannot intelligently exercise the power to
waive counsel and that in the vast majority of children's court cases
the child requires the assistance of counsel. The child requires such
assistance throughout the proceeding in order to understand his
rights, to be able to negotiate a consent decree, to defend against the
charges in the petition, and to present to the court that evidence
which will be helpful in the dispositional process. The knowledge
and technical skills required to participate in these proceedings are
beyond the understanding and ability of virtually all children, particularly those who are likely to become involved in the children's
court. The Children's Code provision that waiver may be effected by
child and parent gives only illusory protection to the child because
parents tend to minimize the seriousness of the proceeding. The
parent also finds himself in a conflict of interest inasmuch as he
must pay for counsel for the child if financially able to do so. This
conflict may result in the parent pressuring the child to waive
counsel, so that instead of having only the delinquency or need of
supervision charge to contend with, the child must oppose his parent
as well. On balance, mandatory provision of counsel for children is
preferable. 4
The Parent'sRight to Counsel
In neglect proceedings, the Children's Code provides that the
parents, guardian, and custodian of the child have a right to counsel
and to have counsel appointed for them upon request if they are
unable to obtain counsel for financial reasons.7" The court must advise the parents, guardian, and custodian of these rights.7
No significant issue of waiver of the parent's right to counsel
decision in Scott v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), which held in effect that the courts might
refrain from appointing counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants so long as they did not
sentence the defendant to imprisonment upon conviction. Thus in Scott, where a $50 fine was
imposed, there was no federal constitutional right to appointed counsel. The reason that
children's court procedures are unaffected by Scott is that, unless the child is released outright,
he will be placed on probation; and one important aspect of probation is that it may be revoked
and the child may be deprived of his liberty. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32-1-34, -43 (1978).
Therefore since every children's court case involves the possibility of loss of liberty, counsel
must be afforded.
74. This is the position of 1JA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating
to Pretrial Court Proceedings, Std 5.1 (1977).
75. N.M. Stat, Ann. § 32-1-27 (F) (1978).
76. Id.
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seems to exist. Where the parents are adults-and they will be in
most cases-presumably they have the capacity to waive their right
to counsel, even where waiver is accomplished by silence. And in
those cases in which the parents of the child are themselves children
because under eighteen years of age, the court may sua sponte
appoint counsel for them even where no request is made.7 7
The Children's Court Rules may have restricted the parental right
to counsel, although probably unintentionally. The Children's Code
does not distinguish between parents who have and who have not
been charged with neglect. It grants the right of appointed counsel to
both. The Rules, however, distinguish between those parents who
are charged in the petition with neglect-who are denominated
"respondents"-and those not so charged, who receive no standing
in the proceeding. 78 Under the Rules, only the respondent parent is
advised of the right to counsel. 79 Thus in the case in which parents
are not living together and the parent with custody8" is charged with
neglecting or abusing the child and the other parent is not named in
the petition, only the parent who is charged with neglect or abuse is
advised of the right to counsel or the right to appointed counsel. This
Rule provision may not supersede the substantive parental right to
counsel given by the Children's Code8" but does at least make the
exercise of that right less likely.
A similar problem seems to exist in both the Children's Code and
the Children's Court Rules in those delinquency cases in which a
parent is joined as a party under section 32-1-47. Under that section,
in any complaint alleging delinquency, a parent may be made a
party. 82 When a parent is made a party, the children's court can
order the parent to participate in counseling or treatment programs
and to pay support for the child if the child is institutionalized. 83 The
84
orders may be enforced by use of the court's contempt power.
Neither the Children's Code nor the Children's Court Rules extends
the right to counsel, or the right to appointed counsel if indigent, to
a parent who has been so joined. Both limit the right to representation and appointed counsel to the child who is alleged to be delinquent.
77. Id.
78. Child. Ct. R. 3(i).
79. Child. Ct. R. 53(d), 55(c).
80. It doesn't matter in these cases whether custody is permanent or has been gained by a
visit or is wrongful.
81. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-27(E) (1978).
82. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-47(A) (1978).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 32-1-37(D).
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ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
The Children's Code provides that, after a child has been taken
into custody or a complaint has been made against the child, no
statement by a child "in connection with the subject matter of the
petition or criminal charge" shall be used against the child in the
adjudicatory stage of the children's court proceeding or in the
criminal trial "unless made while the child was advised by
counsel." 8 5 This protection against uncounseled statements transcends that accorded by Miranda,8 6 which extends the protection only
to custodial interrogation; if the section is read literally, the protection for children would extend even to admissions made to friends or
strangers at a time when the child was at large after a complaint had
been made. 8 ,
This provision may be viewed as a policy determination against
the use of admissions and confessions in the children's court. The
policy is based on the belief that most cases can be proved without
the use of confessions. So perceived, the rule may be seen as a
deliberate impediment to the fact-finding process. It is opposed by
law enforcement personnel, children's court attorneys, and others
on the ground that many children escape adjudication for delinquency because their confessions cannot be used against them.
The true underlying premise, however, seems to be that (1) a child,
like an adult, has a right to the advice of counsel during custodial
interrogation, and (2) a child should not be allowed to waive his
right to counsel, so that (3) the child must have counsel present at
custodial interrogation. If it is concluded that the child should not be
permitted to waive the right to counsel, then the Children's Code
provisions relating to confessions and admissions are reasonable.
The counterargument comes from expediency: that investigationincluding interrogation-should not be impeded by artifical devices
and that if the child can be induced to talk, voluntarily and intelligently, and in so doing confesses, then so much the better for all. Of
course the same expediency argument-which tips the scales against
the individual and in favor of the prosecution-could be used to
deny counsel not only at interrogation but also at trial.
The United States Supreme Court in In re Gault88 declared that a
85. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-27(B) (1978). Section 32-1-27(C)(3) further provides that an
extra-judicial confession or admission must be corroborated by other evidence. See State v.
Doe, 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 164 (Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1980).
86. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
87. Cf. State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 92, 570 P.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1977) where statements made by a
child's captors to the police after the child had been taken into custody were admissible.
88. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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child in a children's court proceeding has a constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court recognized that "special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf
of children," and that "the police, Juvenile Courts and appellate
tribunals" would be assisted in administering the privilege by the
participation of counsel for the child. 8 9 Gault did not provide a solution to the problem, however.
Several approaches may be taken with respect to the admissibility
of confessions by children.
1. The child's confession may not be used against him. This
would adopt the principle that no child is capable of waiving his
right against self-incrimination. However, if strictly applied, this
would mean that no child would be allowed to admit before the
children's court that he had committed the acts with which he is
charged. A guilty plea is a judicial confession and thus no child
could admit the allegations of the petition and a full trial would be
necessary in every case. Consequently, the rule could not be strictly
applied; it must be limited to certain circumstances, such as confessions made during interrogation, whether custodial or not.
2. The child's confession may only be used against him if voluntarily and intelligently made with the assistance of counsel. Basically, this is the position taken by the Children's Code;9 0 it affords a
waivable right against self-incrimination but a non-waivable right to
counsel in the process. The Children's Code applies this rule strictly
to statements made after a complaint has been made or the child has
been taken into custody, and prior to the court hearing, but then permits the child to waive counsel before the court and to enter a
judicial confession. Interestingly, this results in a different kind of
rule: a confession is inadmissible unless made with the assistance of
counsel or unless made before a judicial officer. 9 '
3. The child's confession may be used against him if voluntarily
and intelligently made. This is the standard employed in criminal
cases involving adults. Additional gloss might be put upon the rule
in cases involving children by requiring specific consideration of factors such as the child's age, education, and intelligence, and the
availability of counsel or a friendly adult at the time of questioning.
Some variations upon the foregoing are also possible. Thus the
New Mexico Council on Crime and Delinquency, in its recommendations on the Children's Code addressed to the New Mexico Juvenile
89. Id. at 55.
90. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-27(B) (1978).
91. Presumably the court in receiving a plea can provide the same safeguards that counsel
affords in a non-judicial setting; but it is doubtful whether experience bears this out.
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Code Task Force, proposed that in cases involving a child who had
not previously been adjudicated a delinquent, uncounseled confessions should not be admissible; where a child had been previously so
adjudicated, however, a confession would be admissible if it were
shown that the child was advised of his right against self- incrimination and right to counsel and "voluntarily agreed to waive his rights
and subject himself to questioning." 9
The Juvenile Code Task Force proposed a different, and curious,
test for admissibility: "No confession shall be admitted or used
against a child or admitted into evidence in an adjudicatory proceeding where the child was not represented by counsel at the time
the confession was given unless represented by counsel at the adjudicatory proceeding." 9 3 Under this test, the child, by waiving counsel,
could preclude the admissibility of his confession. But is it proper to
pose this choice to the child: waiver of counsel at trial or admissibility of confession?
The Juvenile Justice Standards take a position consistent with that
of the Children's Code. Standard 5.3(c), Standards Relating to Interim Status, provides that while the child may, upon advice of
counsel, waive the presence of counsel during the period between
arrest and being taken to a detention facility, any information obtained by police questioning done in the absence of an attorney for
the child shall be inadmissible.9
In the final analysis, if uncounseled confessions or admissions by
children are to be admissible in evidence, then the courts must accept
the not inconsiderable burden of scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding the confession or admission. This duty extends beyond the
trial courts to the appellate courts, which must express a willingness
to review the evidence and to avoid upholding every decision by the
trial court.95 It is largely due to a fear that the courts have not per92. Children's Code Recommendations of New Mexico Council on Crime and Delinquency,
Recommendation 4.2 (1979). With due respect, it must be noted that the NMCCD recommendation, focusing as it does upon waiver of the right to remain silent, ignores the issue of
whether the statement itself was voluntarily and intelligently made. However, if section
32-1-27(C)(1) were retained, the problem would be obviated.
93. Juvenile Code Task Force, Response to H.M. 58-Relating to a Study of the Children's
Code 11 (1979).
94. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). But cf. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards
Relating to Police Handling of Juvenile Problems, Std 3.2 & note, at 72 (1977) (which indicate
that the child may waive the right to have counsel present during interrogation, rendering the
confession admissible).
95. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967):
If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was
obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but alsoy that it
was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or
despair.
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formed and will not perform this function that more limitations
have been placed upon children's confessions than on adults'.
NEED OF CARE OR REHABILITATION
The Children's Code, in defining both a delinquent child and a
child in need of supervision, includes as a necesary element that the
child be "in need of care or rehabilitation." 9 6 Thus in order to determine that a child is a delinquent, the children's court must not only
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the delinquent act charged, but also that the child is in need of care or
rehabilitation.9" While "evidence of the commission of an act which
constitutes a felony is sufficient to sustain a finding that the child is
in need of care or rehabilitation, '9 8 in all non-felony cases (and also
in all felony cases where evidence to the contrary is adduced), the
child's need for care or rehabilitation must be established by "clear
and convincing evidence, competent, material and relevant in
nature." ' 9 If the court finds that the child is not in need of care or
rehabilitation, the petition must be dismissed and the child released
no matter how serious the conduct.' 0 0
Sections 29(b) and (c) of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act provide
that a need for care or rehabilitation must be shown before delinquency or need for supervision can be found.,0 , The comment to the
section states:
Under this section, when delinquency or unruly conduct is
alleged, the court must find further that the child is in need of
treatment or rehabilitation before the dispositions authorized by
the Act can be resorted to. Otherwise the case must be dismissed.
If the need for treatment or rehabilitation does not exist, the
primary thrust of Gault is that the departure from criminal proceedings is no longer justified.
Section 32 of the Legislative Guide to Drafting Family and Juvenile
Court Acts, from which section 32-1-31 of the Children's Code is
drawn, adopted the Uniform Act approach, but with a significant
96. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-3(M)(4), -3 (0) (Supp. 1979).
97. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31(E) (1978).
98. Id.
99. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31(F) (1978). A subsidiary question which arises under this section is how a child can intelligently admit a need for care or rehabilitation.
100. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31(E) (1978).
101. The Uniform Juvenile Court Act was promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1968. It is noteworthy that the Standard Juvenilt
Court Act (6th ed. 1959), published by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, contains no requirement of a need for care, rehabilitation or treatment.
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modification. Sections 29(b) and (c) of the Uniform Act permit the
need for treatment or rehabilitation to be shown by "all evidence
helpful" including oral and written reports, even though not admissible in the hearing on the petition. Section 32 of the Legislative
Guide, on the other hand, limits the evidence to "competent,
material, and relevant in nature," and thereby applies the rules of
evidence.
The requirement of a need for care and rehabilitation has led to
difficulties for New Mexico courts. In State v. Doe,"o2 decided in
1977 by the court of appeals, the children's court had found that the
child committed the delinquent acts, but neglected to find the child
in need of care or rehabilitation. After a sixty-day diagnostic commitment, the child was placed on probation. Probation was revoked
and the child was committed to the Boys' School. On appeal, it was
held that the original adjudication and order placing the child on
probation was void because of failure to find the child was in need of
care or rehabilitation. The court declared "that there are two aspects
to the determination that a child is a delinquent child-the act, and
the need for care or rehabilitation."'0 3 Consequently, the order
revoking probation and committing the child to the Boys' School
was also void. The cause was remanded "for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion,"' the court apparently believing that
the missing finding could be supplied. In a subsequent State v. Doe
case decided the same year the court of appeals reached the same
result.'0 5
In 1978 the issue of the need for care or rehabilitation came before
the supreme court in Doe v. State. "6 This was a case in which a child
had been committed to the Boys' School for larceny of less than $100
and in which no evidence had been presented as to the need for care
or treatment other than a pre-disposition report submitted after the
trial. Because the offense was not a felony, the children's court was
required to find need of care or rehabilitation "on the basis of clear
and convincing evidence, competent, material and relevant in
nature."' 0 The pre-disposition report, being hearsay, failed to meet
his evidentiary standard. At first the supreme court remanded for a
learing upon the care or rehabilitation issue,' 8 but upon recon102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

90 N.M. 249, 561 P.2d 948 (Ct. App. 1977).
Id. at 250, 561 P.2d at 949.
Id. at 251,561 P.2d at 950.
91 N.M. 356, 573 P.2d 1211 (Ct. App. 1977).
92 N.M. 74, 582 P.2d 1287 (1978).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31(F) (1978).
The original opinion was reported in 17 N.M. St. B. Bull. 2628 (July 27, 1978).
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sideration a new opinion was issued which reversed the adjudication
outright with instructions to dismiss the petition, on the ground that
the prohibition against double jeopardy would be violated if a further hearing was held.'°' The court reasoned that under the statute,
the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding to which double jeopardy
attached embraced both the issue of whether the delinquent act had
been committed and the issue of need for care or rehabilitation.
Because there had been a failure of proof of the need for care or
rehabilitation, the child would be put twice in jeopardy by a rehearing of the issue.III
If a finding of the need for care or rehabilitation is viewed as a
part of the determination of delinquency, then the supreme court
acted consistently with prior criminal decisions holding that a failure
of proof bars a retrial."' But unless the prior Doe cases"II mentioned
above are considered to have been overruled by Doe v. State, we are
confronted with the anomalous situation in which a finding of need
for care or rehabilitation based on insufficient evidence mandates a
reversal and dismissal of the petition while a failure to make a finding or a finding made without any hearing brings about a reversal
and remand for a hearing at which the necessary proof can be made.
Conceding that the law of double jeopardy is highly technical, and
may cause results which unaided reason could not accomplish, the
distinction is nevertheless difficult to accept.
In a subsequent 1979 State v. Doe decision of the court of
appeals,' 'I the requirement that the children's court find a need for
care or rehabilitation resulted in an opinion which is either a splendid example of fine judicial reasoning or a misreading of the statute
which strains credulity. The child was charged with three misdemeanors and found delinquent on evidence that he had committed
the acts charged and that he was in need of care or rehabilitation. No
evidence of the need for care or rehabilitation was received apart
from that adduced to prove the commission of the misdemeanors.
The court of appeals turned to the language of the statute: "In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, evidence of the commission of
an act which constitutes a felony is sufficient to sustain a finding
109. 92 N.M. 74, 76, 582 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1978).
110. Cf. State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 158, 571 P.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that where a
petition was dismissed after trial on the merits because of failure of proof, rule against double
jeopardy prohibited retrial).
11l. State v. Davis, 92 N.M. 341, 587 P.2d 1352 (Ct. App. 1978); State v. Malouff, 81 N.M.
619, 471 P.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1970); State v. Vallo, 81 N.M. 148, 464 P.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1970).
112. See text accompanying notes 102 and 105 supra.
113. 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 238 (Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1979).
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that the child is in need of care or rehabilitation."' 4 The court concluded that evidence showing commission of any felony, whether
charged or not, was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.
"If there is evidence of 'an act' which constitutes a felony, in the
absence of contrary evidence, that evidence sustains a finding that
the child is in need of care or rehabilitation, whether or not the
felony act was charged in the petition."''II Because there was
evidence of burglary in the case, as well as evidence of a felony
attempt, and no evidence to show a lack of need for care or rehabilitation, the court of appeals sustained the children's court finding
that such a need existed." ,6
The problems which the courts have had with the care or rehabilitation requirement as an element of adjudication of delinquency or
need of supervision require that the whole concept be reexamined. Is
need of care or rehabilitation a necessary element of delinquency or
need of supervision? Does it properly relate to the finding of delinquency? Should it not be considered as a part of the dispositional
evidence? It is noteworthy that the Juvenile Justice Standards Relating to Adjudication do not make the need for care or rehabilitation a
part of the adjudication decision." ' The Standards place consideration of the needs of the child within the criteria for disposition. "8
As matters now stand, the care or rehabilitation element is a
troublesome formality which continues to breed appeals while providing few advantages to children. There may be very real academic
concern that some child who has committed a delinquent act but
who has reformed prior to the children's court proceeding will be
subjected to needless coercive treatment; yet as a practical matter the
children's court will find a need for care or treatment to exist in
every case in which acts of a delinquent nature or acts which evidence need for supervision are found to have been committed. It is
unreasonable to suppose that, having found that a child committed
criminal acts, the court will look solely to the child's need for care or
rehabilitation and not consider the societal interest in punishment or
incapacitation.
114. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31(E) (1978).
115. 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 238, 240 (Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1979). It is uncertain what is meant by
"evidence of an act." How much evidence? What is the burden of persuasion here-beyond a
reasonable doubt, clear and convincing or a scintilla?
116. Id.
117. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Adjudication, Std
5.1(B) (1977).
118. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Dispositions, Std
2.2 (1977).
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The need for care or rehabilitation is more fittingly considered in
the dispositional process where the court is charged with shaping a
disposition to meet the child's needs as well as society's interests.
The Children's Code should be amended to conform to this reality.
DISPOSITION: PROPORTIONAL SANCTIONS
A basic principle of the Children's Code is that the delinquent act
committed by a child is a symptom of the need for care and treatment and when such a manifestation is perceived the focus of the
process should shift from the act to the needs of the child. Because
the individual needs of each child differ, the Code cannot establish
sanctions to be imposed for any particular act but must retain flexibility to meet the needs of the particular child. Thus once the delinquent act establishes jurisdiction, it loses significance. The result is
that, under the Children's Code, a child may be committed to an institution for delinquents for a maximum term of one year if his
needs so indicate, whether he has committed petty theft or
homicide, ,,9 and the commitment may be extended until the child's
twenty-first birthday in either case. 2
This is the one aspect of the Children's Code least understood by a
public accustomed to thinking of sanctions in terms of desert: the offender is to receive such punishment as is merited by the nature and
consequences of his act. The public has not accepted the individualized treatment principle of the Children's Code and is not likely to
do so in the immediate future. If the delinquency procedures of the
Children's Code are to receive public support, then the treatment of
delinquent children, particularly those committing serious criminal
acts, must reflect the public concern with proportionality between
the harm occasioned by the offense and the treatment accorded the
offender.
Serious offenses by children may be dealt with in a variety of
ways. First, the law might be amended so as to exempt serious offenses such as murder, armed robbery, aggravated assaults and batteries, rape, and aggravated burglary from the jurisdiction of the
children's court. Alternatively, the jurisdictional age for all children
might be reduced, which would ensure that the great majority of
serious offenses would be subject to criminal prosecution. This
would mean adopting a definition of child to include only those persons who had not achieved their thirteenth or perhaps fourteenth
119. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32-1-34(B) (1978), -38(A) (Supp. 1979).
120. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-38(E), (F), (H) (Supp. 1979).
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birthday.' 1 A third approach would be to amend the transfer
statute"'2 so that children who were charged with serious offenses
might be more easily transferred to district court for criminal prosecution. It should be considered that these proposals create a new
problem: the child becomes subject to criminal prosecution, with
resulting criminal conviction and incarceration as a convicted
criminal. If this were done, changes would have to be made in correctional treatment for the young; it is doubtful whether the public
would support incarceration of persons fourteen or fifteen years of
age in the penitentiary.
A further manner of dealing with the problem of serious criminal
acts by children would be to acknowledge that the children's justice
system embodies an element of punishment and incapacitation of
child offenders. The Children's Code could then be amended to permit the court to commit serious offenders to institutions for
lengthened periods of time proportional to the seriousness of the
crime; juvenile offenders would still be required to serve shorter
sentences than an adult criminal would serve for a similar offense.
This approach would represent a departure from the traditional
treatment and rehabilitation approach of the children's justice
system, but would accommodate the expectations of the public while
retaining many of the benefits of children's court system.
One suggestion for proportionality of sanctions is found in the
Juvenile Justice Standards Relating to Juvenile Delinquency and
Sanctions which classifies juvenile offenses according to the severity
of the adult penalty for a like offense and provides for institutional
commitments from three to twenty-four months, depending upon
the class of the offense.' 2 3 Thus the Juvenile Justice Standards
approach would lengthen commitments for serious offenses while
shortening commitments for minor or petty offenses.
Shortening the period of commitment would eliminate the potential gross disparity between the maximum imprisonment an adult
might receive and that which a child might receive. Thus for a petty
misdemeanor-for example, stealing property with a value of less
than $100-under present law an adult might receive a maximum six
121. The thirteenth birthday is suggested because children below this age commit very few
violent crimes. P. Strasburg, Violent Delinquents 48-51 (1978). The fourteenth birthday is suggested because at common law a rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit a crime existed in favor of children less than fourteen. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 351 (1972).
122. Seenote 131 infra.
123. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions, Stds 5.1 through 6.4 (1977).
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month jail sentence,' 2 but a child could receive a "full-term" one
year commitment to an institution for delinquent children.' 2 5 The
child's commitment might be extended until his twenty-first birthday."2" Thus, in its potential effect upon the child, the New Mexico
Children's Code differs little from the situation described as existing
in Arizona in In re Gault: a child was committed to the state industrial school for the period of his minority for an offense for
which an adult could have been incarcerated only 60 days.' 2 7
Three changes in the Children's Code are therefore necessary: (1)

the maximum term of confinement for a severe offense possible
under a children's court commitment should be increased;' (2)
reduced periods of confinement for minor offenses should be provided so that the children's court may commit a child for a period
less than a full-term commitment (without using the facilities of the
youth diagnostic center for a purpose other than diagnosis);' 29 and
(3) at the same time, provisions for extending the period of commitment beyond its original length as imposed by the children's
court should be abolished.
TRANSFER FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
One of the least satisfactory aspects of the law and procedure
applicable to children's court proceedings relates to the power of the
court to terminate jurisdiction in delinquency cases by transferring
the child to the district court for criminal prosecution. The power to
transfer is not without limitation; in New Mexico transfer may only
occur upon a finding of reasonable ground to believe the child com124. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-19-1(B) (1978).
125. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-38(A) (Supp. 1979).
126. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-38(H) (Supp. 1979).
127. 387 U.S. at 7-9.
128. The maximum term of commitment need not be only 24 months, as proposed by the
Juvenile Justice Standards, but might be substantially longer for very serious offenses. The
Children's Code should provide specific maxima for different classes of offenses; the intent
would not be simply to extend the possible commitment term three or four years for every
delinquent child, or even for every delinquent child who had committed a felony.
129. Specific legislation permitting commitment for shorter periods is necessary, particularly in view of the October 17, 1979 opinion of New Mexico Attorney General Jeff F.
Bingaman that under the present Children's Code the court has no power to transfer a child to
an institution for delinquent children for a period of less than a year. N.M. Atty. Gen. Op.
79-37 (1979).
The present absence of statutory authority for short-term corrective confinement has not
prevented the children's courts from committing children to the Youth Diagnostic Center for
60 days "shock therapy." The author's experience in New Mexico's children's courts is that
children are often given a 60-day diagnostic commitment largely to afford them a taste of
imprisonment rather than for diagnosis. Legislation permitting short-term confinement would
reduce this misuse of diagnostic facilities.
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mitted a felony, and the child must have been sixteen or older when
the act was committed, unless the charge is murder where he need be
only fifteen or older. In addition, there must be a determination of
whether the child is amenable to treatment or rehabilitation in facilities available to the children's court.' 3
The statutory provision for transfer of criminal prosecution
reflects a recognition that when an older child commits a serious
criminal act, the children's justice system is inadequate to protect
society or to impose the punishment believed to be merited by serious criminality.
Transfer procedures are, however, unsatisfactory for two principal reasons. First, the standards for determining when transfer
may take place are so vague and uncertain that their application
must vary significantly from judge to judge and from case to-case.
Thus under no circumstances is transfer mandatory; the children's
court judge may decline to order a transfer even if the statutory requirements have been met.' 31 Further, the mandated findings themselves leave much latitude for interpretation. For example, under the
original transfer statute, one precondition to transfer is that the
court find reasonable grounds to believe "the interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint or
discipline."' 32 Second, the child is transferred into the adult criminal
justice system, which has no adequate institutions or facilities for
dealing with young persons. If the child is convicted, confinement
with older convicts can only lead to abuse of the child or to a hardening of his character which inhibits rehabilitation.
The latter problem may be alleviated by adopting a system for
prosecuting and incarcerating or supervising youthful offenders,
perhaps between sixteen and twenty-four years old. The aim of this
system would be to rehabilitate rather than punish to the extent consistent with the public safety. The goal would be to divert young persons from life-long criminality before their characters and attitudes
become permanently fixed. Sentences for many offenses would be
shorter than those imposed upon mature persons. Separate institutional facilities would be used in which the emphasis would be on
education and rehabilitational activity rather than "serving time."
The initial cost would be substantial, but the long-term benefits
could offset this cost. Such a system would provide some break in
130. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32-1-29(A)(4),.-30(A)(4) (1978).
131. Both transfer statutes provide that the court "may" transfer the matter for prosecution
in the-district court if certain conditions are met. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32-1-29(A), -30(A)
(1978).
132. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-l-29(A)(4)(d)(1978).
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the cruel offender/cruel state syndrome which afflicts New Mexico,
whereby criminal offenders commit acts of great cruelty, and are
dealt with by the state with equal or greater cruelty. 3 3
New Mexico's 1917 juvenile court Act gave to the juvenile court
"exclusive original jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents and over
those who contribute to such delinquency."' 3 This language is misleading, though, because it was clear that some actions involving
children might still be entertained in other courts. Thus the 1917 Act
empowered-although it did not mandate-the district court "to
cause any case against a person under the age of sixteen years to be
transferred to the juvenile court docket." 3 There was, however, no
express provision for transfer from juvenile court to district court
for criminal prosecution.
The actual practice under the 1917 Act is very unclear for two
reasons. First, the language of the Act is singularly muddy; and
second, due to the fact that the supreme court early ruled that there
was no right of appeal from the juvenile court,' 36 there are no cases
involving juvenile court transfers and there are no written judicial
interpretations of the Act. Thus it was not until 1943, when an adjudicated juvenile took his case to the New Mexico Supreme Court by
habeas corpus, that the supreme court was required to pass upon the
constitutionality of the Act or to interpret its ambiguity. In re Santillanes'" is a marvelous anti-Gault decision, holding that a child
before the juvenile court had no right to protection against double
jeopardy or self-incrimination because a juvenile court proceeding
was not a criminal proceeding, but instead a "special statutory proceeding."' 3 8 In Santillanes, the court construed the juvenile court act
to mean that a child was entitled to one juvenile court adjudication,
after which he became "incorrigible" and would be prosecuted cri133. New Mexico penal philosophy is based upon an escalation of the lex talionis: for an
eye, both eyes; for a finger, both hands. The author knows of a recent example in which a
defendant convicted of criminal sexual penetration received a sentence of 74 to 250 years, to
run consecutively to an earlier 127- to 635-year sentence. The wholly unrealistic nature of these
sentences is compounded by the brutal conditions under which they must be served. The particular defendant had survived the 1980 prison riot less than a month prior to his sentencing
and had narrowly escaped death. The sentencing court was unmoved by the fact that, having
subjected the defendant to conditions of imprisonment in which violence and death were likely,
the state had already exacted a frightful price. For so long as New Mexico treats convicted
felons as animals, they will act as animals.
134. 1917 N.M. Laws ch. 4, § 2.
135. 1917 N.M. Laws ch. 4, § 8.
136. See, e.g., State v. Florez, 36 N.M. 80, 8 P.2d 786 (1931); State v. Eychaner, 41 N.M.
677, 73 P.2d 805 (1937). Even under the 1955 Juvenile Code problems of the right of appeal
persisted. State v. Urioste, 63 N.M. 335, 319 P.2d 473 (1957).
137. 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
138. Idat 151, 138 P.2d at 505.
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minally for all offenses for which trial by jury was guaranteed. The
supreme court was quite evidently unhappy with the result, but concluded that in the face of the confused language of the statute it had
done the best that it could.' 3 9
Prior to 1943, a child could be criminally prosecuted or proceeded
against in the juvenile court at the discretion of the prosecuting
attorney. If a criminal proceeding were filed in the district court, the
case could be transferred to the juvenile court. After being adjudicated as a delinquent, a child was "incorrigible" and thereafter
was subject to criminal prosecution in all cases in which there was a
right to trial by jury.
In 1943 the juvenile court Act was amended to redefine delinquency and eliminate the provision as to incorrigibility,'" to give
exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court in misdemeanor offenses,'" and to provide expressly that nothing in the juvenile court
act prevents "any person of whatever age" from being prosecuted
for felony, in the district court and from being sentenced to the
penitentiary under the criminal law.'14 Cases could still be transferred from the district court to the juvenile court.
The 1955 Juvenile Code expressly provided that no person under
eighteen years of age might be charged with the commission of a criminal offense in any court other than the juvenile court.' 4 3 A child
fourteen or over who was charged with a felony might be bound over
for criminal prosecution after a preliminary hearing in the juvenile
is not a proper subcourt "if such court shall find that such4 juvenile
4

ject for reformation or rehabilitation." '

As originally enacted in 1972, the Children's Code permitted the
children's court to transfer for criminal prosecution children who
had committed a felony after reaching sixteen years of age, provided
At that hearing the court had to find
that a hearing was held.
reasonable grounds to believe that the child committed the act, the
child was not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child
through available facilities, the child was not committable to an in139. Id. at 159-60, 138 P.2d at 515-16.
140. 1943 N.M. Laws ch. 40, § 1.The prior statute, § 44-101, defined a juvenile delinquent
as one "who is incorrigible." The amended statute uses the language "who... by reason of
"
being incorrigible. . . is uncontrolled by his parents ..
141. See 1943 N.M. Laws ch. 40, § 6, which required the transfer to the juvenile court of all
cases brought in the city or justice of the peace courts charging a person under the age of 18
with a crime or with violation of an ordinance.
142. 1943 N.M. Laws ch. 40, § 4.
143. 1955 N.M. Laws ch. 205, § 9. This section was clumsily worded, and was clarified by
1959 N.M. Laws ch. 361, § 3.
144. 1955 N.M. Laws ch. 205, § 9.
145. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 97, § 27 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-29 (1978)).
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stitution for mentally retarded or mentally ill, and the interests of
the community required that the child be placed under legal restraint
or discipline. , 6
In 1975, reacting to the contention that the recited safeguards were
too stringent in cases of serious crimes and that the age requirement
was too limiting, particularly in murder cases, the legislature
adopted an alternative "discretionary" transfer system whereby a
child of fifteen could be transferred for murder and a child of sixteen could be transferred for certain serious felonies such as rape,
kidnapping, aggravated arson, aggravated battery, and aggravated
burglary.' 7 The statute required a hearing, a finding of reasonable
grounds to believe that the child committed the offense and that the
children's court consider "whether the child is amenable to treatment through available facilities.'""
One of the chief objections to the transfer statutes has been that
they are so lacking in standards governing the transfer that they are
unconstitutionally vague. The 1943 amendment to the original juvenile court act was challenged in State v. Doyal.'4 A child was pro-

secuted in district court for two murders allegedly committed when
he was fourteen years old. He claimed that the district court should
have remanded the cases to the juvenile court, and attacked the statute for its lack of standards. The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the Act, stating that the transfer provision had to be read in the
light of the enunciated standard that "the entire proceedings and
adjudication, if any, are to be had for the rehabilitation and best
interest and welfare of the juvenile delinquent.""'5 In State v.
Jimenez,"'' decided in 1972, the transfer provision of the 1955
Juvenile Code was attacked for vagueness; it was upheld on the
ground that State v. Doyal was dispositive of the issue.' 52
In State v. Doe,'53 decided in 1978, the 1975 transfer statute was
attacked for vagueness, on the ground that the language requiring
the court merely to "consider" whether the child is amenable to
treatment enunciated no standard at all. The court of appeals upheld
the statute, construing "consider" to mean "to reflect on, to think
about with a degree of care and caution."' 5 It held that the term was
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
1975 N.M. Laws ch. 320, § 4 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-30 (1978)).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-30(A)(2), (4), (5) (1978).
59 N.M. 454, 286 P.2d.306 (1955).
Id. at 459-60, 286 P.2d at 310 (quoting 1943 N.M. Laws ch. 40, § 4).
84 N.M. 335, 503 P.2d 315 (1972).
Id. at 336, 503 P.2d at 316.
91 N.M. 506, 576 P.2d 1137 (Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 508, 576 P.2d at 1139.
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one which could be understood by persons of common intelligence
and therefore not unconstitutionally vague.'" For authority, the
court looked to Webster's Third International Dictionary which
gives as a first definition of "consider" that expounded by the opinion. However, the dictionary goes on to state that the word "often
indicates little more than 'think about.' "16 When the word is
viewed in the context of the statute, it is questionable whether any
more than "think about" is connoted. Moreover, even if the
children's court were required to use "a degree of care and caution"
in so considering, there is nothing in the statute which requires the
court to act one way or the other after having done so. Thus the
court in Doe depended upon a very slender reed indeed and clearly
was grasping tenuously to uphold the statute.
It is said that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Therefore
before condemning the decision upholding the 1975 transfer statute
we must learn how this decision has subsequently been applied.
Application came in the 1979 case of State v. Doe, '" in which a child
of fifteen was transferred upon a murder charge following the
shooting of a teenage friend while on a deer hunt. All evidence of
amenability to treatment or rehabilitation before the children's court
pointed to the conclusion that the child might be treated successfully
at the Boys' School at Springer. Nevertheless the children's court
ordered the transfer.'" Chief Judge Wood, author of the opinion
upholding the statute, engaged in reasoning worthy of a medieval
scholastic to hold that the transfer was invalid.
Section 32-1-30(A)(4), supra, requires the court to 'consider' this
uncontradicted evidence; that is, to think about this evidence
with a degree of care and caution. State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 506,
supra. The 'thinking about' this evidence should be in relation to
the legislative purpose of rehabilitation, Section 32-1-2(B),
supra, and in relation to the transfer being discretionary under
Section 32-1-30, supra. If the court thought about the uncontradicted evidence of amenability with a degree of care and caution, and rejected it, it was an abuse of discretion. . . . If the
court accepted the uncontradicted evidence of amenability, and
nevertheless ordered the transfer, it was an abuse of discretion
because of a failure to think about the evidence with care and
caution. If the court failed to consider the uncontradicted evidence of amenability, the transfer order was an abuse of discre155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 509, 576 P.2d at 1140.
Webster's Third International Dictionary 483 (1976).
18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 787 (Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1979).
Id. at 788.
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tion because of a failure to comply with the statutory requirement that the amenability evidence be considered.'"
On the ground that no matter how the pie was cut the children's
court had abused its discretion, the transfer order was reversed.
The question which remains is whether this decision heralds a new
day in appellate consideration (the word is used advisedly) of children's court transfer orders. In the past, the appellate courts have all
too frequently appeared to defer to the lower court's ruling ordering
transfer, no matter how skimpy or unsatisfactory the evidence to
support the order appeared to be. 60 Because a transfer proceeding is
as weighty in terms of consequence to the child as any known to the
law, it seems that the appellate courts have a special duty to make
certain that no injustice is done and that a transfer order is fully supported by the law and the evidence. If Chief Judge Wood's decision
in the 1979 Doe case is indeed a harbinger of a new day, then it is
most welcome.
Another problem involves what charges can be transferred from
children's court to district court. In State v. Garcia, 6 decided in
1979, the children's court transfer order listed only the offenses of
"murder, and, alternatively, felony murder, with attempted robbery
as the underlying felony."' 6 2 Garcia was subsequently indicted upon
charges of accessory to felony murder, accessory and co-conspirator
to attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and was tried and convicted on all counts.' 63 On
appeal, it was argued that the criminal prosecution was limited to
those acts set forth in the transfer order. The supreme court rejected
the argument, holding that "[i]f the children's court finds at the
hearing on a transfer that the juvenile should be prosecuted as an
adult, then the adult division obtains personal jurisdiction over the
child and subject matter jurisdiction over the entire case." ' ' 64 In so
ruling, the court recognized a policy against fragmentation of criminal proceedings-which would have occurred had the children's
court retained jurisdiction over some of the charges-and cited a
159. Id. at 789.
160. See State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688 (1976), in which the supreme court
dismissed a double jeopardy claim by quoting Justice Cardozo's language about "gossamer
possibilities of prejudice." See also Matter of Doe, 89 N.M. 700, 556 P.2d 1176 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 89 N.M. 700, 556 P.2d 1176 (1976), as to whether felony murder had been
established in the children's court transfer proceeding. Proper consideration of this decision requires an examination of the records and briefs in the case.
161. 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 504 (July 12,1979).
162. Id. at 505.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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New Jersey case'"" in support of the policy. The New Jersey decision
was based upon that state's transfer statute which spoke in terms of
waiving jurisdiction 66"over a case" and referring "that case to the
appropriate court."
The supreme court decision in Garcia is more complex than the
New Jersey decision, because both New Mexico transfer statutes
provide:
The transfer terminates the jurisdiction of the court over the
child with respect to delinquent acts alleged in the petition. No
child shall be prosecuted in the district court for a criminal offense originally subject to the jurisdiction of the children's court
unless the case has been transferred as provided in this section."7
The supreme court did not refer to this language in the Garciaopinion. However, it is plain from the statute that Garcia was subject to
criminal prosecution for only those offenses charged in the petition,
and not for all criminal acts involved in the "entire case." From the
facts in Garcia, it appears that all, or virtually all, of the crimes for
which Garcia was criminally prosecuted were set forth in the second
amended children's court petition although not all were included in
the transfer order. The supreme court decision therefore may be correct under its facts but it is not justified by the reasons given in the
opinion.
The issue assumes importance in a case in which the children's
court petition only alleges one offense, such as larceny, and after
transfer the defendant is charged criminally with burglary and larceny. Under the Children's Code, only the larceny charge is properly
within the jurisdiction of the district court in the criminal prosecution, and the children's court still has exclusive jurisdiction over the
burglary charge, because burglary was not specified in the transfer
order. Under the Garcia decision, however, the district court has
jurisdiction to try both crimes, since they both were a part of the
"case. "
A somewhat different but related issue arises where the defendant
is convicted in the criminal prosecution not of the crimes charged,
but of lesser included offenses. Thus, a child of fifteen might be
transferred on a first degree murder charge but convicted only of
manslaughter in the district court.' 6s Or a child charged in the
165.
166.
167.
168.

Stateexrel. R.L.P., 159 N.J. Super. 267, 387 A.2d 1223 (App. Div. 1978).
Id. at 268, 387 A.2d at 1224 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4-48 (West 1979)).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32-1-29(C), -30(B) (1978).
This did occur in State v. Doyal, 59 N.M. 454, 286 P.2d 306 (1955).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

children's court with felony murder arising from burglary and larceny and transferred for criminal prosecution might be acquitted of
the murder and burglary and convicted only of larceny. The question
is whether the child, not having been convicted upon the serious offenses for which transfer was ordered, should be punished criminally, or whether there should not be some provision for retransfer
to the children's court for disposition upon the less serious offenses.
Thus if the children in the two cases given above had originally been
charged in the children's court with only the offenses for which they
were ultimately convicted, arguably there would have been no transfer. While the gravity of the offense charged is not an express element of transfer, nevertheless it must be considered in assessing
amenability of the child to treatment or rehabilitation on the
grounds that more serious crimes generally require longer and more
intensive treatment. Furthermore, experience suggests that the gravity of the offense charged is a factor in the children's court attorney's decision to file a transfer motion as well as the children's court
decision on whether a transfer should be ordered.
CONFIDENTIALITY: CLOSED HEARINGS AND FILES
As enacted in 1972, the Children's Code placed a mantle of
secrecy about the entire children's court process. 69 Records and files
concerning delinquency, need of supervision, and neglect proceedings were generally kept from the general public, including the
press. Members of the press and others might be permitted to attend
hearings if found by the court "to have a proper interest in the case
or in the work of the court," but only "on the condition that they
refrain from divulging any information which would identify the
child or family involved in the proceedings."71
Restriction of public access to information about delinquency
cases was not new to New Mexico in 1972. The original juvenile
delinquency act of 1917 provided that hearings were to be private if
requested by the juvenile or if otherwise ordered by the court.' 7 ' In
1943, the juvenile delinquency act was amended to provide that
court records should be sealed and disclosed only to parties, court
personnel, and probation officers; these records could be disclosed
to others only on court order." 2 All of this was swept away by the
169. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 97, §§ 28(B), 41, 42. See Comment, The Freedom of the Press vs.
The ConfidentialityProvisions in the New Mexico Children's Code, 4 N.M.L. Rev. 119(1973).
170. 1972 N.M. Laws ch. 97, § 28(B).
171. 1917 N.M. Laws ch. 4, § 7. This section was amended in 1943 to make private hearings
discretionary with the court. 1943 N.M. Laws ch. 40, § 4.
172. 1943 N.M. Laws ch. 40, § 4.
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1955 Juvenile Code which made no provision for closed hearings
and expressly provided that court records, other than probation officers' reports and the records of the probation office or district
attorney's office, "shall be public records and open to inspection.'''"
On the other hand, no provision was made for confidentiality of
hearings or records in neglect cases prior to 1972. This may appear
somewhat anomalous from today's viewpoint, as there is presently
more support for closed neglect hearings than for closed delinquency
or need of supervision hearings.' 74
After enacting the Children's Code with its blanket confidentiality
provisions, the legislature promptly reduced the amount of secrecy.
In 1973 the Code was amended to provide that once a child has been
adjudicated a delinquent, future delinquency proceedings are open
to public hearing,' 75 and that court records pertaining to an adjudicated delinquent other than social reports are public records.' 6 In
addition, the section making law enforcement records relating to
children confidential and not open to the public was repealed. 77
The issue of whether children's court hearings and records should
be closed to the general public arises regularly, and is one of the biggest controversies surrounding the children's court. On the one
hand, secrecy protects child and parent from harmful publicity and
permits the maintenance of a therapeutic milieu in which problems
of delinquency, need of supervision, and neglect can be worked out.
On the other hand, secrecy is harmful because it minimizes the
seriousness of the acts of children and parents, prevents public
understanding, restricts freedom of the press and freedom of information, and makes impossible the kind of public disapprobation of
offenders which can have an inhibitory or deterrent effect upon
repetition of offenses.
In particular, victims of child offenses are prohibited from knowing what disposition, if any, has been made of the offender, or, in
173. 1955 N.M. Laws ch. 205, § 48.
174. The proposed Juvenile Code of 1979, as introduced in the New Mexico Legislature,
provided that in all juvenile court delinquency proceedings and neglect proceedings not involving sexual abuse, the hearings and records (other than social records and diagnostic reports)
would be open to the public. S. 231, §§ 16, 23, N.M. 34th Leg., 1st Sess. (1979). The response
from the public and from professionals from within the children's justice system was strongly
against permitting public access to hearings and records in neglect cases, and the bill was
promptly amended to provide public access only in delinquency proceedings.
175. 1973 N.M. Laws ch. 195, § I(B) (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31(B) (1978)).
176. 1973 N.M. Laws ch. 195, § 2 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-44 (1978)). The crime
of divulging unauthorized information, found in this and the section mentioned in the
preceding footnote, was also reduced from misdemeanor to petty misdemeanor,
177. 1973 N.M. Laws ch. 195, § 3.
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many cases, even who the offender is or where he lives. These prohibitions create fear and resentment on the part of victims of delinquent offenses. While victims can be admitted to hearings under the
existing provisions of the Children's Code, since they "have a proper interest in the case,'" I few victims have the time or the inclination to attend children's court hearings and even fewer know that
they have the right to do so. Yet, if the victim does not attend the
hearing, it may be impossible for him to learn of the disposition of
the case unless he obtains an order from the court to inspect the
court record. I 9
The Juvenile Justice Standards unequivocally state that
Standard
"[iluvenile records should not be public records." '
15.1(B), Standards Relating to Juvenile Records and Information
Systems provides: "Access to and the use of juvenile records should
be strictly controlled to limit the risk that disclosure will result in the
misuse or misinterpretation of information, the unnecessary denial
of opportunities and benefits to juveniles, or an interference with the
purposes of official intervention." The Commentary to the Standard points out that "The principle that juvenile court records
should be confidential and, therefore, should not be public records is
well accepted and is an express part of the law of most states." 18 '
One report notes that forty-three states prohibit public inspection of
juvenile court records. 8 2
Others of the Juvenile Justice Standards place similar limits upon
the use of other aspects of juvenile proceedings, such as social
histories and other information gathered by agencies, case files and
docket records, and police records.' 8 3 Disclosure of such records
may be only to the child, parents, law enforcement officers, probation officers, and juvenile correctional agencies.
With respect to adjudicatory hearings upon delinquency petitions
in the juvenile court, on the other hand, the Juvenile Justice Standards take the position that the child has a right to a public hearing
which right may be waived after consultation with counsel. 8 In the
absence of waiver, all hearings would be open to the public.
178. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-31(B)(1978).
179. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-44 (1978). But see § 32-1-31(C) (parties granted admission to a
closed hearing guilty of a petty misdemeanor for divulging information).
180. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Juvenile Records
and Information Systems, Std 15.1 (A) (1977).
181. Id. at 115.
182. M. Levin & R. Sarri, Juvenile Delinquency: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Codes in
the United States 58 (1974).
183. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Juvenile Records
and Information Systems, Stds 15.1 through 15.6 (1977).
184. IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Adjudication,
Stds 6.1, 6.2 (1977).

Summer 19801

NEW MEXICO CHILDREN'S CODE

Confidentiality need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. The
purposes served by keeping proceedings and records from public
attention must be weighed against the gains to society if part or all of
the hearings and records of the children's court are opened. In
neglect and abuse cases in which parental malfeasance or misfeasance is less than criminal, there is no need to open proceedings and
records to public scrutiny. To the degree that neglect cases reflect the
workings of the therapeutic welfare state whereby private resolution
of parent-child problems is supplanted by state action, the persons
involved merit the same protection given inmates in a public mental
institution or community hospital. If neglect or abuse becomes
criminal, then the proceedings and court files are public.
The same balancing approach to delinquency and need of supervision cases has been suggested by Judge Macklin Fleming of the California Court of Appeals. While children who are charged with
minor conduct "such as malicious mischief, petty theft, simple
assault and automobile joy-riding" should not be stigmatized with
criminal conviction or public denunciation which would result from
open hearings and files, children charged with serious crimes of
violence such as murder, armed robbery, and rape need not be so
protected. 8 ' Such an approach, based upon the severity of the offense or perhaps based upon an age limit, is preferable to the present
system of maintaining secrecy for the first juvenile delinquency
adjudication and withdrawing it thereafter without regard to
whether the delinquent act consisted of petty theft or armed robbery.
CONCLUSION
Not all of the problems of the children's justice system have been
considered or even touched upon in this discussion. Serious issues
exist as to whether children's court jurisdiction should be retained
over children in need of supervision, and how neglect and abuse
cases can be handled to foster family reintegration, and not "lose"
children in the system. Problems also exist in programs for prevention, supervision, treatment, and correction. These topics must
await consideration by others.

185. M. Fleming, Crimes and Rights 167 (1978).

